CCPortal
DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102938
The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements
发表日期2024
ISSN0095-0696
EISSN1096-0449
起始页码124
卷号124
英文摘要This paper investigates the impact of the timing of adaptation on the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for different levels of cooperation. This issue is addressed by solving a three-stage coalition formation game in a Nash-Cournot setting. In the first stage, countries decide non-cooperatively on their participation in an IEA. Then, depending on the timing, countries decide on adaptation and emissions in the second and third stage. The game is solved for three levels of cooperation. Countries can either cooperate on emissions (emission agreement), on adaptation (adaptation agreement), or both actions (complete agreement). When emissions are chosen first, this extension to an emission-adaptation game is a generalization of the pure emission game. However, when adaptation is chosen first, the grand coalition is stable, provided that countries sign a complete agreement. With partial cooperation, stable coalitions are small. The results establish a connection between the strategic role of adaptation, the levels of adaptation of non-signatories and signatories for the different types of agreements and the participation in an IEA. Moreover, the results indicate that the grand coalition is stable even when it significantly enhances net benefits.
英文关键词International environmental agreements; Emission-adaptation game; Prior commitment; Strategic effects; Participation; Effectiveness of adaptation
语种英语
WOS研究方向Business & Economics ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology
WOS类目Business ; Economics ; Environmental Studies
WOS记录号WOS:001184258400001
来源期刊JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/294650
作者单位University of Graz; University of Graz; University of Valencia
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
. The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements[J],2024,124.
APA (2024).The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements.JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT,124.
MLA "The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements".JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 124(2024).
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。