气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications

CCPortal

DOI	10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102520
	Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications
	Naime J.; Angelsen A.; Molina-Garzón A.; Carrilho C.D.; Selviana V.; Demarchi G.; Duchelle A.E.; Martius C.
发表日期	2022
ISSN	0959-3780
卷号	74
英文摘要	Collective Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), where forest users receive compensation conditional on group rather than individual performance, are an increasingly used policy instrument to reduce tropical deforestation. However, implementing effective, (cost) efficient and equitable (3E) collective PES is challenging because individuals have an incentive to free ride on others’ conservation actions. Few comparative studies exist on how different enforcement strategies can improve collective PES performance. We conducted a framed field experiment in Brazil, Indonesia and Peru to evaluate how three different strategies to contain the local free-rider problem perform in terms of the 3Es: (i) Public monitoring of individual deforestation, (ii) internal, peer-to-peer sanctions (Community enforcement) and (iii) external sanctions (Government enforcement). We also examined how inequality in wealth, framed as differences in deforestation capacity, affects policy performance. We find that introducing individual level sanctions can improve the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of collective PES, but there is no silver bullet that consistently improves all 3Es across country sites. Public monitoring reduced deforestation and improved the equity of the program in sites with stronger history of collective action. External sanctions provided the strongest and most robust improvement in the 3Es. While internal, peer enforcement can significantly reduce free riding, it does not improve the program's efficiency, and thus participants’ earnings. The sanctioning mechanisms failed to systematically improve the equitable distribution of benefits due to the ineffectiveness of punishments to target the largest free-riders. Inequality in wealth increased group deforestation and reduced the efficiency of Community enforcement in Indonesia but had no effect in the other two country sites. Factors explaining differences across country sites include the history of collective action and land tenure systems. © 2022 The Authors
英文关键词	Climate change; Common-pool resources; Framed Field Experiments; Payment for Ecosystem Services; Tropical deforestation
语种	英语
scopus关键词	climate change; deforestation; ecosystem service; equity; policy implementation; tropical forest; Brazil; Indonesia; Peru
来源期刊	Global Environmental Change
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/256628
作者单位	School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), PO Box 50031432 Ås, Norway; Department of Political Science, Institute of Behavioural Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States; Universidade de São Paulo – USP, Brazil; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia; French National Research Institute for Agriculture, Food and Environment (INRAE), Montpellier, France; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) Germany gGmbH, Charles-de-Gaulle Strasse 5, Bonn, 53113, Germany
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Naime J.,Angelsen A.,Molina-Garzón A.,et al. Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications[J],2022,74.
APA	Naime J..,Angelsen A..,Molina-Garzón A..,Carrilho C.D..,Selviana V..,...&Martius C..(2022).Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications.Global Environmental Change,74.
MLA	Naime J.,et al."Enforcement and inequality in collective PES to reduce tropical deforestation: Effectiveness, efficiency and equity implications".Global Environmental Change 74(2022).