气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power

CCPortal

DOI	10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112308
	Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power
	Heim S.; Götz G.
发表日期	2021
ISSN	0301-4215
卷号	155
英文摘要	We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power that did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and bidding strategies using micro-level bidding data, we find a concentrated market with highly pivotal suppliers in an environment with completely inelastic demand and high entry barriers. We provide descriptive evidence that the price increase was triggered by an abuse of the “guess the clearing price” principle of discriminatory auctions via repeated pretended “bad guessing” of the marginal bid by the most dominant supplier. As intentional “bad guessing” of marginal bids is hard to prove, this suggests that the auction design is crucial for the competition authority's monitoring power – an issue that is often neglected in the discussion on the properties of auction designs. In fact, given regulatory threats, the deemed main advantage of pay-as-bid auctions over uniform price auctions and the popular belief that they reduce dominant suppliers' withholding incentives and diminish their ability to tacitly collude may be questioned in non-static settings. This suggests that pay-as-bid auctions may not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive behavior, but can even increase them when market power is high and demand inelastic, which is the case in virtually all energy markets. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd
英文关键词	Auctions; Balancing power; Collusion; Energy markets; Market power; Reserve power
语种	英语
scopus关键词	Auction design; Auction markets; Balancing power; Collusion; Energy markets; Market Power; Pay-as-bid auction; Power; Price increase; Reserve power; Power markets; auction; competition (economics); energy market; price dynamics; Germany
来源期刊	Energy Policy
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/256588
作者单位	MINES ParisTech (CERNA), PSL, France; University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas (CRED), France; ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Mannheim, Germany; University of Gießen, Germany
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Heim S.,Götz G.. Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power[J],2021,155.
APA	Heim S.,&Götz G..(2021).Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power.Energy Policy,155.
MLA	Heim S.,et al."Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power".Energy Policy 155(2021).