Climate Change Data Portal
DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112029 |
Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil | |
Pellegrini L.; Arsel M.; Orta-Martínez M.; Mena C.F.; Muñoa G. | |
发表日期 | 2021 |
ISSN | 03014215 |
卷号 | 149 |
英文摘要 | To limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 °C, about 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas and oil reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil. While the concept of ‘unburnable fuels’ has become prominent, there has been little discussion on institutional mechanisms to identify specific fossil fuel reserves to be left untouched and the financial mechanisms for raising and distributing funds to compensate the right-holders for forgoing extraction. We present an auction mechanism to determine the fossil fuel reserves to be kept untapped – those whose extraction would generate the least rents, ensuring cost efficiency. The auctions could be complemented by other provisions to reap collateral benefits of avoided extraction, for example by prioritizing reserves that coincide with outstanding socio-environmental values that are likely to be disrupted by the extraction of fossil fuels. We also discuss how to raise funds, for example through a fossil fuel producers-based tax, to finance the mechanism compensating right-holders and ensuring commitment. The effective identification of unburnable fossil fuel reserves and the development of accompanying funding mechanisms seems to be the elephant in the room of climate negotiations and we aim at contributing to an overdue discussion on supply-side interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. © 2020 The Authors |
关键词 | Abatement policiesClimate changeEfficient climate policiesGlobal warmingGreenhouse gas emissionsMarket-based policy instrumentsUnburnable fossil fuel reserves |
英文关键词 | Extraction; Finance; Gas emissions; Greenhouse gases; Proven reserves; Auction mechanisms; Cost efficiency; Environmental values; Funding mechanisms; Global-mean temperature; Oil reserves; Supply sides; Fossil fuels; abatement cost; climate change; emission control; energy market; environmental policy; environmental values; fossil fuel; greenhouse gas; institutional framework; elephant |
语种 | 英语 |
来源期刊 | Energy Policy |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/205292 |
作者单位 | International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands; Instituto de Geografía, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador; Faculty of Sciences and Technology, Central University of Catalonia-University of Vic, Catalonia, Spain; Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona (ICTA-UAB), Catalonia, Spain |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pellegrini L.,Arsel M.,Orta-Martínez M.,et al. Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil[J],2021,149. |
APA | Pellegrini L.,Arsel M.,Orta-Martínez M.,Mena C.F.,&Muñoa G..(2021).Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil.Energy Policy,149. |
MLA | Pellegrini L.,et al."Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil".Energy Policy 149(2021). |
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