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DOI10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112029
Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil
Pellegrini L.; Arsel M.; Orta-Martínez M.; Mena C.F.; Muñoa G.
发表日期2021
ISSN03014215
卷号149
英文摘要To limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 °C, about 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas and oil reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil. While the concept of ‘unburnable fuels’ has become prominent, there has been little discussion on institutional mechanisms to identify specific fossil fuel reserves to be left untouched and the financial mechanisms for raising and distributing funds to compensate the right-holders for forgoing extraction. We present an auction mechanism to determine the fossil fuel reserves to be kept untapped – those whose extraction would generate the least rents, ensuring cost efficiency. The auctions could be complemented by other provisions to reap collateral benefits of avoided extraction, for example by prioritizing reserves that coincide with outstanding socio-environmental values that are likely to be disrupted by the extraction of fossil fuels. We also discuss how to raise funds, for example through a fossil fuel producers-based tax, to finance the mechanism compensating right-holders and ensuring commitment. The effective identification of unburnable fossil fuel reserves and the development of accompanying funding mechanisms seems to be the elephant in the room of climate negotiations and we aim at contributing to an overdue discussion on supply-side interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. © 2020 The Authors
关键词Abatement policiesClimate changeEfficient climate policiesGlobal warmingGreenhouse gas emissionsMarket-based policy instrumentsUnburnable fossil fuel reserves
英文关键词Extraction; Finance; Gas emissions; Greenhouse gases; Proven reserves; Auction mechanisms; Cost efficiency; Environmental values; Funding mechanisms; Global-mean temperature; Oil reserves; Supply sides; Fossil fuels; abatement cost; climate change; emission control; energy market; environmental policy; environmental values; fossil fuel; greenhouse gas; institutional framework; elephant
语种英语
来源期刊Energy Policy
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/205292
作者单位International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands; Instituto de Geografía, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador; Faculty of Sciences and Technology, Central University of Catalonia-University of Vic, Catalonia, Spain; Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona (ICTA-UAB), Catalonia, Spain
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Pellegrini L.,Arsel M.,Orta-Martínez M.,et al. Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil[J],2021,149.
APA Pellegrini L.,Arsel M.,Orta-Martínez M.,Mena C.F.,&Muñoa G..(2021).Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil.Energy Policy,149.
MLA Pellegrini L.,et al."Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil".Energy Policy 149(2021).
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