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DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112014 |
On the role of electricity storage in capacity remuneration mechanisms | |
Fraunholz C.; Keles D.; Fichtner W. | |
发表日期 | 2021 |
ISSN | 03014215 |
卷号 | 149 |
英文摘要 | In electricity markets around the world, the substantial increase of intermittent renewable electricity generation has intensified concerns about generation adequacy, ultimately driving the implementation of capacity remuneration mechanisms. Although formally technology-neutral, substantial barriers often exist in these mechanisms for non-conventional capacity such as electricity storage. In this article, we provide a rigorous theoretical discussion on design parameters and show that the concrete design of a capacity remuneration mechanism always creates a bias towards one technology or the other. In particular, we can identify the bundling of capacity auctions with call options and the definition of the storage capacity credit as essential drivers affecting the future technology mix as well as generation adequacy. In order to illustrate and confirm our theoretical findings, we apply an agent-based electricity market model and run a number of simulations. Our results show that electricity storage has a capacity value and should therefore be allowed to participate in any capacity remuneration mechanism. Moreover, we find the implementation of a capacity remuneration mechanism with call options and a strike price to increase the competitiveness of storages against conventional power plants. However, determining the amount of firm capacity an electricity storage unit can provide remains a challenging task. © 2020 The Authors |
关键词 | Agent-based simulationCapacity remuneration mechanismElectricity marketElectricity storageEnergy-only marketMarket design |
英文关键词 | Power markets; Capacity auctions; Conventional power plants; Electricity market model; Electricity storages; Future technologies; Generation adequacy; Renewable electricity; Technology neutrals; Electric energy storage; alternative energy; design; electricity generation; electricity supply; energy market; energy storage; numerical model |
语种 | 英语 |
来源期刊 | Energy Policy
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文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/205096 |
作者单位 | Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Chair of Energy Economics, Hertzstraße 16, Karlsruhe, 76187, Germany; Technical University of Denmark, Energy System Analysis Section, Akademivej Building 358, 2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fraunholz C.,Keles D.,Fichtner W.. On the role of electricity storage in capacity remuneration mechanisms[J],2021,149. |
APA | Fraunholz C.,Keles D.,&Fichtner W..(2021).On the role of electricity storage in capacity remuneration mechanisms.Energy Policy,149. |
MLA | Fraunholz C.,et al."On the role of electricity storage in capacity remuneration mechanisms".Energy Policy 149(2021). |
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