气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Economic and environmental strategies against targeting energy subsidy in Iranian meat market: A game theory approach

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DOI	10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112153
	Economic and environmental strategies against targeting energy subsidy in Iranian meat market: A game theory approach
	Fathi F.; Bakhshoodeh M.
发表日期	2021
ISSN	03014215
卷号	150
英文摘要	This study sought to investigate the economic-environmental effects of Targeted Subsidy Policy on energy in the meat market of Iran within a game theory framework. The welfare of players in economic game, determined by equilibrium displacement model, and the environmental losses (benefits) from Greenhouse Gas emissions were considered as game payoffs based on the behavior of three players: producers, consumers, and government. Results show an increase in the piece of energy carriers as a policy deterred from enhancing environmental losses and reducing the welfare of each market player. Therefore, eliminating energy subsidy, and redistributing its revenue toward producers to improve technology are regarded as the government's strategy for economic-environmental equilibrium, while removing energy subsidy without repaying is considered as equilibrium strategy in which the effects of Targeted Subsidy Policy are only considered economically or environmentally. Finally, the effect of losses from Greenhouse Gas emissions, caused by increasing the production of livestock products, on reduced energy consumption related to each production unit in meat market was further compared with the positive effect of technology improvement. Therefore, shrinking government size beside its monitoring increase can play an effective role in improving the situation of the meat market. © 2021 Elsevier Ltd
关键词	Energy policy Game theory GHG emissions Meat market Welfare
英文关键词	Agriculture; Commerce; Consumer behavior; Energy utilization; Environmental management; Environmental technology; Game theory; Gas emissions; Greenhouse effect; Greenhouse gases; Meats; Public policy; Displacement model; Energy carriers; Energy subsidies; Environmental strategy; Equilibrium strategy; Production units; Reduced energy; Technology improvement; Economic and social effects; emission; energy policy; environmental economics; food market; game theory; greenhouse gas; meat; subsidy system; welfare economics; Iran
语种	英语
来源期刊	Energy Policy
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/205091
作者单位	Department of Agricultural Economics, School of Agriculture, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Fathi F.,Bakhshoodeh M.. Economic and environmental strategies against targeting energy subsidy in Iranian meat market: A game theory approach[J],2021,150.
APA	Fathi F.,&Bakhshoodeh M..(2021).Economic and environmental strategies against targeting energy subsidy in Iranian meat market: A game theory approach.Energy Policy,150.
MLA	Fathi F.,et al."Economic and environmental strategies against targeting energy subsidy in Iranian meat market: A game theory approach".Energy Policy 150(2021).