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DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111462 |
Designing effective auctions for renewable energy support | |
Matthäus D. | |
发表日期 | 2020 |
ISSN | 03014215 |
卷号 | 142 |
英文摘要 | Governments use procurement auctions for renewable energy support to stimulate investment in renewable energy. The main challenge in auction design is the balance between cost-efficient procurement and high post-auction realization, i.e., effective procurement. I empirically assess the effect of prevalent auction design elements on effectiveness, using a unique dataset with results of auctions for renewable energy support from 1990 to 2017. I find that pre-qualifications and penalties drive realization rates, while technological banding or the pricing rule do not affect effectiveness. The former is in line with existing theory, while the latter sheds new lights on auction models and case studies discussing auction outcomes, as literature has thus far broadly agreed on a major influence of all design elements. According to my results, policy makers which focus on high realization rates should include pre-qualification measures and penalties into their design. Importantly, policy makers gain more degrees of freedom regarding other design features to tailor renewable energy auctions to their country. This freedom is advantageous in view of a large variety of countries adapting renewable energy auctions. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd |
关键词 | Auction designClimate changeRenewable energy support |
英文关键词 | Commerce; Costs; Decision making; Degrees of freedom (mechanics); Design; Auction design; Auction model; Cost-efficient; Design elements; Design features; Pre-qualification; Procurement auction; Renewable energies; Investments; alternative energy; auction; design; energy market; investment |
语种 | 英语 |
来源期刊 | Energy Policy |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/204772 |
作者单位 | Technical University of Munich, Arcisstraße 21, Munich, 80335, Germany; MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthäus D.. Designing effective auctions for renewable energy support[J],2020,142. |
APA | Matthäus D..(2020).Designing effective auctions for renewable energy support.Energy Policy,142. |
MLA | Matthäus D.."Designing effective auctions for renewable energy support".Energy Policy 142(2020). |
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