气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): How to avoid history repeating itself: the case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) price floor revisited

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DOI	10.1080/14693062.2019.1682494
	How to avoid history repeating itself: the case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) price floor revisited
	Flachsland C.; Pahle M.; Burtraw D.; Edenhofer O.; Elkerbout M.; Fischer C.; Tietjen O.; Zetterberg L.
发表日期	2020
ISSN	1469-3062
卷号	20 期号:1
英文摘要	Several years of very low allowance prices in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) have motivated calls to introduce a price floor to correct potential underlying distortions and design flaws, including (i) the political nature of allowance supply and related credibility issues, (ii) potential myopia of market participants and firms, and (iii) waterbed and rebound effects resulting from policy interactions. In the wake of the recent EU ETS reform, allowance prices have sharply increased. This raises the question of whether the case for introducing a price floor in the EU ETS remains valid. We argue that such a price floor, also adopted in several other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems worldwide, remains an important improvement in the design of the system, as long as the above-mentioned distortions and design flaws persist. An EU ETS price floor can safeguard against these issues and provides more explicit guidance on the minimum allowance price policymakers consider acceptable. Either as a complement or substitute to the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR), a price floor would thus make the EU ETS less prone to future revision in case of unexpectedly low prices. We identify and confront four prominent arguments against the introduction of an EU ETS price floor. Key policy insights An EU ETS price floor would be an important institutional innovation enhancing political and economic stability, and predictability of the EUA price The recent Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reform has not removed the need for a carbon price floor. Introducing an element of price responsiveness into the so far purely quantitative design of the EU ETS would help to preserve its integrity In contrast to conventional wisdom, legal analysis reveals that an EU ETS price floor can be legally feasible Political support for a carbon price floor is gaining traction across Europe. © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
英文关键词	EU ETS; market stability reserve; policy credibility; price floor
来源期刊	CLIMATE POLICY
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/183786
作者单位	Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Berlin, Germany; Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany; Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Potsdam, Germany; Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, United States; Faculty VI, Planning Building Environment, Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, Belgium; School of Business and Economics, Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Svenska Miljöinstitut IVL, Stockholm, Sweden
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Flachsland C.,Pahle M.,Burtraw D.,et al. How to avoid history repeating itself: the case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) price floor revisited[J],2020,20(1).
APA	Flachsland C..,Pahle M..,Burtraw D..,Edenhofer O..,Elkerbout M..,...&Zetterberg L..(2020).How to avoid history repeating itself: the case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) price floor revisited.CLIMATE POLICY,20(1).
MLA	Flachsland C.,et al."How to avoid history repeating itself: the case for an EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) price floor revisited".CLIMATE POLICY 20.1(2020).