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| DOI | 10.1073/pnas.1917028117 |
| Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it | |
| Lampert A. | |
| 发表日期 | 2020 |
| ISSN | 0027-8424 |
| 起始页码 | 10210 |
| 结束页码 | 10217 |
| 卷号 | 117期号:19 |
| 英文摘要 | The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations. © 2020 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. |
| 英文关键词 | Dynamic games; Environmental management; Harmful species; International cooperation; Multiple agents |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| scopus关键词 | chemical agent; algorithm; Article; control; harmful organism; health care policy; management; Markov chain; mathematical model; population dynamics; priority journal; social welfare |
| 来源期刊 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
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| 文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 条目标识符 | http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/160962 |
| 作者单位 | Lampert, A., School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, United States, Simon A. Levin Mathematical, Computational and Modeling Science Center, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, United States |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lampert A.. Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it[J],2020,117(19). |
| APA | Lampert A..(2020).Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,117(19). |
| MLA | Lampert A.."Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it".Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117.19(2020). |
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