气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty

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DOI	10.1073/pnas.1916637117
	Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty
	Abatayo A.L.; Bosetti V.; Casari M.; Ghidoni R.; Tavoni M.
发表日期	2020
ISSN	0027-8424
起始页码	13393
结束页码	13398
卷号	117 期号:24
英文摘要	Climate engineering-the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the Earth's climate system-is a set of technologies for reducing climate-change impacts and risks. It is controversial and raises novel governance challenges [T. C. Schelling, Climatic Change, 33, 303-307 (1996); J. Virgoe, Climatic Change, 95, 103-119 (2008)]. We focus on the strategic implications of solar geoengineering. When countries engineer the climate, conflict can arise because different countries might prefer different temperatures. This would result in too much geoengineering: the country with the highest preference for geoengineering cools the planet beyond what is socially optimal at the expense of the others-a theoretical possibility termed "free-driving" [M. L. Weitzman, Scand. J. Econ., 117, 1049-1068 (2015)]. This study is an empirical test of this hypothesis. We carry out an economic laboratory experiment based on a public "good or bad" game. We find compelling evidence of free-driving: global geoengineering exceeds the socially efficient level and leads to welfare losses. We also evaluate the possibility of counteracting the geoengineering efforts of others. Results show that countergeoengineering generates high payoff inequality as well as heavy welfare losses, resulting from both strategic and behavioral factors. Finally, we compare strategic behavior in bilateral and multilateral settings. We find that welfare deteriorates even more under multilateralism when countergeoengineering is a possibility. These results have general implications for governing global good or bad commons. © 2020 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
英文关键词	Climate governance; Geoengineering; Inequality; Multilateralism
语种	英语
scopus关键词	article; climate; cooling; theoretical study; uncertainty; welfare
来源期刊	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/160909
作者单位	Abatayo, A.L., Ettore Bocconi Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, 20136, Italy, Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy, and Networks, Bocconi University, Milan, 20136, Italy; Bosetti, V., Ettore Bocconi Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, 20136, Italy, Centre for Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy, and Networks, Bocconi University, Milan, 20136, Italy, RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan, 20144, Italy; Casari, M., Department of Economics, Bologna University, Bologna, 40126, Italy, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States; Ghidoni, R., Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, 20126, Italy, CentER, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, 5037AB, Netherlands; Tavoni, M., RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan, 20144, Italy, Center for European Studies, Politecnico di ...
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Abatayo A.L.,Bosetti V.,Casari M.,et al. Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty[J],2020,117(24).
APA	Abatayo A.L.,Bosetti V.,Casari M.,Ghidoni R.,&Tavoni M..(2020).Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,117(24).
MLA	Abatayo A.L.,et al."Solar geoengineering may lead to excessive cooling and high strategic uncertainty".Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117.24(2020).