气候变化领域集成服务门户(CCPortal): A dynamic climate finance allocation mechanism reflecting the Paris Agreement

CCPortal

DOI	10.1088/1748-9326/ab443b
	A dynamic climate finance allocation mechanism reflecting the Paris Agreement
	Egli F.; Stünzi A.
发表日期	2019
ISSN	17489318
卷号	14 期号:11
英文摘要	Reaching the goal of the Paris Agreement requires substantial investment. The developed country parties have agreed to provide USD$100 billion in climate finance annually from 2020 to 2025. Ongoing negotiations on post-2025 commitments are likely to exceed that sum and include a broader scope of parties. However, there is no guidance regarding the allocation of contributions. Here, we develop a dynamic mechanism based on two conventional pillars of a burden sharing mechanism: emission responsibility and ability to pay. The mechanism adds dynamic components that reflect the Paris principle to 'ratchet-up' ambition; it rewards countries with ambitious mitigation targets and relieves countries with a high degree of climate vulnerability. Including developed country parties only, we find that ten countries should bear 85% of climate finance contributions (65% if all parties to the Paris Agreement are included). In both scopes, increasing climate ambition is rewarded. If the EU increased its emission reduction target from 40% to 55% by 2030, member states could reduce their climate finance contributions by up to 3.3%. The proposed mechanism allows for an inclusion of sub-, supra- or non-state actors. For example, we find a contribution of USD$3.3 billion annually for conventionally excluded emissions from international aviation and shipping. © 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd.
英文关键词	climate finance; climate policy; equity principles
语种	英语
scopus关键词	Emission control; Investments; Allocation mechanism; Climate policy; Climate vulnerability; Developed countries; Emission reduction targets; equity principles; International aviation; Substantial investments; Dynamics; climate change; emission control; environmental economics; environmental policy; European Union; vulnerability
来源期刊	Environmental Research Letters
文献类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://gcip.llas.ac.cn/handle/2XKMVOVA/154746
作者单位	Energy Politics Group, ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, Zürich, 8092, Switzerland; Department of Economics/Resource Economics, ETH Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, Zürich, 8092, Switzerland
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Egli F.,Stünzi A.. A dynamic climate finance allocation mechanism reflecting the Paris Agreement[J],2019,14(11).
APA	Egli F.,&Stünzi A..(2019).A dynamic climate finance allocation mechanism reflecting the Paris Agreement.Environmental Research Letters,14(11).
MLA	Egli F.,et al."A dynamic climate finance allocation mechanism reflecting the Paris Agreement".Environmental Research Letters 14.11(2019).